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A LARGE POPULATION PARENTAL CARE GAME: POLYMORPHISMS
AND FEEDBACK BETWEEN PATTERNS OF CARE AND THE
OPERATIONAL SEX RATIO
DAVID M. RAMSEY
Abstract. This article presents a game theoretic model of parental care which models the
feedback between patterns of care and the operational sex ratio. It is assumed here that males
can be in one of two states: searching for a mate or breeding (including caring for their offspring).
Females can be in one of three states: receptive (searching), non-receptive or breeding. However,
these sets of states can be adapted to the physiology of a particular species. The length of time
an individual remains in the breeding state depends on the level of care an individual gives.
When in the searching state, individuals find partners at a rate dependent on the proportion of
members of the opposite sex searching. These rates are defined to satisfy the Fisher condition
that the total number of offspring of males equals the total number of offspring of females.
The operational sex ratio is not defined exogenously, but can be derived from the adult sex
ratio and the pattern of parental care. Pure strategy profiles and so called single sex stable
polymorphisms, in which behaviour is varied within one sex, are derived analytically. The
difference between mixed evolutionarily stable strategies and stable polymorphisms within this
framework is highlighted. The effect of various physiological and demographic parameters on
patterns of care are considered.
Key words and phrases. evolutionarily stable strategy, cycle time, Fisher condition, polymorphism, mixed
strategy.
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1. Introduction
Research on the evolution of patterns of parental care have indicated the complex nature of
this process. Trivers (1972) gave an in depth exposition of the then current state of research into
patterns of parental care. By definition females invest more in gametes. He argues that females
have more to lose than males if the offspring die and should thus invest more in caring for their
offspring. Males can potentially reproduce at a much higher rate than females. However, due to
the physiological constraints of breeding, the ratio of the number of males searching for a mate
to the number of such females (the operational sex ratio, OSR) will tend to be much greater
than one, i.e. males may face strong competition from other males when looking for a mate. It
is argued that due to these factors, males should attempt to maximise the number of females
they breed with by being attractive to females and/or outcompeting other males, rather than
investing in parental care.
Emlen and Oring (1977) carried out an excellent review on the evolution of mating systems.
They define the concept of the OSR and its relation with sexual selection. They note the
feedback between patterns of parental care and the mating system (e.g. clear mutual mate
choice is normally associated with biparental care). In addition, they note that parental care
in the form of egg incubation among birds will affect the OSR (the more males care, the less
male-biased the OSR is). Kokko and Jennions (2008) argue that if males desert then it is difficult
for them to find a partner (since the OSR is male biased). It follows that if the level of male
desertion increases, paternal care may well become a relatively more successful strategy, i.e.
parental care is subject to frequency dependent selection.
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Dawkins and Carlisle (1976) argue that Trivers’ argument is a type of ”Concorde fallacy”,
i.e. if one has invested heavily in a project, then one should continue even if losses are expected.
The decision of a female on whether to care for her present brood should, in evolutionary terms,
be based on a comparison of her future gains from care with the gains she could achieve by
following another strategy. Maynard Smith (1977) defends Trivers’ approach to some degree
by stating that in calculating the expected number of future offspring one needs to take into
account the investment that has to be made. In this paper Maynard Smith describes three
models of parental care. The first two are matrix games in which deserting males find another
partner with probability p. He recognized that this probability depends on the behaviour of the
population as a whole, i.e. treating p as fixed is a weak point of the model. The third model is
more realistic, since it takes into account the Fisher condition that the total number of offspring
of males equals the total number of offspring of females (see Houston and McNamara, [2002],
[2005], Kokko and Jennions [2003]). This third model is a so called ”time in/time out” model
in which individuals spend part of the time breeding and caring for their young and part of
their time searching for a partner (between breeding attempts). The cycle time of an individual
is the mean time he/she spends between breeding attempts. If the adult sex ratio is r, then
the mean cycle time of males must be r times the mean cycle time of females. It is assumed
that individuals maximise the rate of producing offspring that survive to adulthood. Grafen
and Sibly (1978) develop this approach. However, these models assume that there is a pure
equilibrium and so do not enable investigating the possibility of stable polymorphisms or mixed
strategies. One other problem lies in the assumption that members of the least common sex in
the mating pool immediately find a mate. As Sze´kely et al. (2000) argue, the problems of mate
choice and parental care are strongly interlinked and such time in/time out models cannot be
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adapted in a simple way to take such feedback into account. Using Maynard Smith’s approach
the OSR is undefined, since members of one of the sexes do not spend any time in the mating
pool.
Clutton-Brock and Parker (1992) consider a similar time in/time out model to derive the OSR
given the adult sex ratio, patterns of parental investment (including both gamete production and
parental care). They include a parameter describing the level of interaction between the sexes
in a population, which in turn defines the mean time individuals spend looking for a partner.
However, they assume that the amount of parental care given is fixed, since their goal is to
derive the OSR and in this way predict which of the sexes will compete most strongly for mates
(assumed to be the most common sex in the pool of searchers). As such, this model does not
gives us any insight into why a particular pattern of parental care evolves. As well as giving an
excellent review of the development of research on patterns of mate choice and parental care,
Kokko and Jennions (2008) extend this model by allowing the level of parental care given to
evolve. Offspring survival is increasing in the level of care from a parent given the level of care
from the other parent. At the time of fertilisation, parents simultaneously choose the amount of
time for which they will care from a continuous range. The minimum time females can choose
is assumed to be larger than the minimum time a male can choose to reflect the fact that males
can replenish their gametes more quickly than females. Sexual selection is incorporated into the
model by assuming that only a fraction of the members of a particular sex mate. Due to the
complexity of the model, they assume that the level of sexual selection is fixed, although they
admit that in reality it would evolve along with the parental care strategies.
The model of Yamamura and Tsuji (1993) is in many ways the most similar to the one
presented here. Just as in Maynard Smith (1977) and Grafen and Sibly (1978) they assume that
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members of the less common sex in the mating pool immediately find a mate. It is assumed that
parents can only make one of two possible decisions: care or desert. Their model was adapted to
the life cycle of the St. Peter’s Fish, Sarotherodon galilaeus by Balshine-Earn and Earn (1997).
As in Yamamura and Tsuji, in the model presented here individuals can make only one of
two possible decisions. This is done partly for simplicity, but mainly for clarity in classifying the
types of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) found and to illustrate the differences between a
stable polymorphism and a mixed ESS within the framework of a large population game. The
model can be relatively easily adapted to allow individuals to choose the level of parental care
they give from some range. As in Kokko and Jennions (2008), members of the less common sex
in the mating pool find mates at a faster rate than members of the more common sex in such a
way that ensures each female mating corresponds to a male mating. Hence, the ASR is fixed,
but the present OSR is derived as a resultant of the ASR and the observed pattern of parental
care, rather than being given as an exogenous parameter. In this way, the OSR and the pattern
of parental-care co-evolve as argued in Jennions and Kokko (2010). The rate at which mates are
found depends on an exogenously defined underlying interaction rate, λ1. This parameter can
be thought of as a measure of the density and mobility of the population. As Kokko and Rankin
(2006) argue, density effects may be very important in the evolution of behaviour. By defining
λ1 and the rate of transition of females from the non-receptive state to the receptive state to
be arbitrarily large, we essentially obtain the model of Yamamura and Tsuji (1993). The model
can be adapted to take into account the particular nature of physiological processes involved in
reproduction (the assumption used here that females can be receptive or non-receptive is used
to model œstrus cycles in mammals). It should be noted that these processes are assumed to
be given (i.e. the model cannot explain why these processes evolved in the first place).
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Sze´kely et al. (2000) argue that there is strong feedback between patterns of mate choice
and patterns of parental care. Owens and Thompson (1994), Kokko and Johnstone (2002)
and Ha¨rdling and Kokko (2005) use a similar approach to the one used here to investigate the
relationships between sexual selection, patterns of mate choice and the sex ratios. Jennions and
Kokko (2010) give a clear exposition of the nature of feedback between various factors in the
reproductive cycle and the interaction between mate choice and parental care.
One major advantage of the approach used here (in comparison to the one used by Yamamura
and Tsuji) is that the model can be directly extended to incorporate the evolution of mate choice,
which is a goal of future research. The expected length of time an individual spends in the mating
pool and type of mate obtained would depend on his/her choosiness and his/her attractiveness as
a mate. The model can also be adapted to take into account differing mortality rates according
to the sex and state of an individual (see Ramsey [2009b], also Kokko and Jenninons [2008]).
Also, the analytic results obtained regarding polymorphisms and mixed ESSes are an advance on
the numerical results obtained by Yamamura and Tsuji and give some insight into intraspecies
variation in patterns of parental care.
All the models described above assume that breeding is non-seasonal and the population size
is large. In such a case, at equilibrium the OSR will be constant over time. In the case of
seasonal breeders, the strategies used by individuals will change over the breeding season and
this is associated with temporal fluctuations in the OSR (see Webb et al. [1999] and McNamara
et al. [2000]).
As argued above, the evolution of mating systems depends on many interacting factors. Verbal
explanations of such evolution cannot realistically take these interactions into account. The
continued development of mathematical models that take such interactions into account will
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prove useful in explaining observed behaviour and predicting the long term reaction of mating
systems to changes in the environment.
Section 2 presents the model and the derivation of so called pure equilibrium profiles in which
all the members of a particular sex always use the same action. Four pure equilibrium profiles
are possible: no parental care, maternal care, paternal care and biparental care. Since there may
be intraspecies variation in the level of parental care and/or female care (see e.g. Booth and
Dabbs [1993]), Section 3 considers stable polymorphisms and mixed equilibrium profiles. At a
stable polymorphism, each individual always uses the same action, but variations in behaviour
are observed within a particular sex. At a mixed equilibrium, the variation in behaviour results
from individuals choosing the action to be used in each breeding attempt at random. Section
4 considers an example and derives the set of pure equilibrium profiles according to the gains
from parental care. Section 5 investigates the relationship between some of the physiological
and demographic parameters and the set of pure equilibrium profiles. This is used to investigate
how the patterns of parental care we expect to see depend on these parameters. Section 6 gives
examples of stable polymorphisms and considers the relation between stable polymorphisms
and mixed equilibria. These results are used to investigate the conditions under which we might
expect variable care patterns within one sex of a particular species and whether one of the
sexes is more likely to exhibit such patterns. Section 7 includes a discussion of the results and
directions for future research.
2. The Model
A basic formulation of this model can be found in Ramsey (2009a). Consider a large popula-
tion in which there is no variation in the quality of mates and individuals only decide whether
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to care for their young or desert. The model can be adapted to allow individuals to choose the
level of care they give from a continuous interval. However, allowing only two discrete actions
will enable us to highlight how the range of possible ESSes in large population games with two
types of player can fundamentally differ from the ESSes in asymmetric 2-player versions of such
a game.
It is assumed that there is no breeding season. Males may be in one of two states: searching
or breeding. Females may be in one of three states: receptive, non-receptive or breeding. These
assumptions reflect the reproductive cycle of most mammals, where females have œstrus cycles
(see Bronson [1989]). However, this model can be adapted to other reproductive cycles. For
example, female rabbits come into œstrus after having sex. In this case, the model may be
simplified so that females are in one of two states: searching or breeding. The general approach to
such a problem would be the same. Within the class of time in/time out models, the adaptability
of this model to the physiological processes observed in a species seems to be novel.
For simplicity, it is assumed that when individuals are in the breeding state that they do
not attempt to (or cannot) breed with other partners. The ratio of the number of males to the
number of females (the ASR) is denoted r. Denote the proportions of males in the two male
states, searching and breeding, as p1 and p2, respectively. The proportions of females in the three
female states, receptive, non-receptive and breeding, are denoted as q1, q2 and q3, respectively.
Males in the searching state find a mate at a rate proportional to the number of receptive
females, namely at rate λ1q1. That is to say that in a small interval of time of length δ units, a
proportion λ1q1δ of searching males will find a mate. Similarly, receptive females find a mate at
a rate proportional to the number of searching males, i.e. at rate λ1p1r. It should be noted that
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these assumptions satisfy the condition that a male entering the breeding state corresponds to
a female going into the breeding state. Also, it is assumed that the population is freely mixing.
Receptive females become unreceptive at rate μ1, i.e. the mean length of their receptive
period is 1μ1 . Unreceptive females become receptive at rate μ2. Hence, given a female does not
mate, she will be receptive for a proportion μ2μ1+μ2 of the time. It is assumed that the parameters
μ1 and μ2 are fixed according to the physiological processes in a species.
The rate at which breeding males rejoin the pool of searching males and females return to
the pool of receptive females depends on whether they care for their young or not. If they do
not care for their young, males return to the pool of searching males at rate λD2 , that is to say
that on average the mating process and time to replenish sperm supplies together occupy on
average 1
λD2
units of time. Similarly, if females do not care for their young they return to the
pool of receptive females at rate μD3 . It is assumed that λ
D
2 is larger than μ
D
3 , i.e. male deserters
can return to searching for a new mate faster than female deserters. When they care for their
offspring, males and females return to the pool of individuals searching for a mate at rates λC2
and μC3 , respectively. It is assumed that λ
C
2 ≈ μC3 . The transition between states is illustrated
in Fig. 1. A summary of the notation used is given in Tables 1-3.
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Males Females
Searching Receptive Non-Receptive
μ1
ff
μ2
 
Male Female
Breeding
 
λ•2 λ1q1 λ1p1r μ•3
Fig. 1: Transition rates between states
• represents C or D according to whether a given sex cares for their offspring or not
Table 1. Glossary of the notation used (ratios)
r adult sex ratio km relative no. of offspring with male care
kf relative no. of offspring with female care kb relative no. of offspring with biparental care
The number of young surviving to maturity per brood is measured in relation to the number
surviving when no parental care is given. Suppose the relative number of young surviving to
maturity when a) just the female cares, b) just the male cares and c) both parents care are kf ,
km and kb, respectively. It is assumed that 1 < kf < kb and 1 < km < kb, i.e. the greater the
number of caring parents, the greater the average number of surviving offspring per brood. See
Gubernick and Teferi (2000) and Wright (2006) for examples of parental care increasing offspring
survival. It is assumed that the goal of each individual is to maximise the rate of producing
offspring that survive until maturity. For simplicity this is referred to as the reproduction rate.
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Table 2. Glossary of the notation used (proportions)
p1 prop. of all males searching p1,C of caring males searching
p1,D of deserting males searching p2 of all males breeding
p2,C of caring males breeding p2,D of deserting males breeding
q1 of all females who are receptive q1,C of caring females who are receptive
q1,D of deserting females who are receptive q2 of all females who are non-receptive
q2,C of caring females who are non-receptive q2,D of deserting females who are non-receptive
q3 of all females breeding q3,C of caring females breeding
q3,D of deserting females breeding sm of males who care
sf of females who care
Table 3. Glossary of the notation used (rates)
μ1 rate at which females become non-receptive μ2 females become receptive
λD2 deserting males return to searching λ
C
2 caring males return to searching
μD3 deserting females return to searching μ
C
3 caring females return to searching
λ1 interaction rate
For other game theoretic models of large population games with state transitions see Broom
and Ruxton (1998) and Eriksson et al. (2004).
2.1. Derivation of Pure Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. In order to investigate the
pure ESSes of such a system, it is necessary to first derive the ”steady-state” proportions of
individuals in each state given the strategy profile used in the population. The strategy profile
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is defined by a description of both the strategies used by the males and the strategies used by
the females. In this section, it is assumed that all individuals of a particular sex use the same
strategy. It should be stressed that the term ”steady-state” will only be used to describe the
values q1, q2, q3, p1 and p2 would tend to, given that the strategy profile used by the population
does not change over time. One important aspect to note is the feedback between selection and
the frequencies of individuals in each state. Selection will change the proportions of males and
females who care for their offspring, which in turn will change these steady-state proportions.
At the steady-state proportions the number of individuals moving from state A to state B per
unit time must equal the number of individuals moving from state B to state A. Considering the
transition of females from receptive to non-receptive, the relative number of females becoming
non-receptive per unit time is the proportion of females who are receptive times the rate of
transition from being receptive to being non-receptive, i.e. q1μ1. This rate will be called the
population rate of transition from receptive to non-receptive. In general, a population transition
rate from state A to state B is obtained by multiplying the proportion of individuals in state
A by the rate at which an individual in state A moves to state B. Thus the population rate of
females becoming receptive per unit time is q2μ2. Hence, at the steady-state proportions
(1) q1μ1 = q2μ2.
Considering firstly the transition rates of receptive females to/from mating females and then
the rate of transition of searching males to/from mating males, since p2 = 1− p1
λ1p1q1r = μ•3q3(2)
λ1p1q1 = λ•2(1− p1),(3)
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where each • corresponds to D or C according the strategy adopted by the appropriate sex. In
addition,
(4) q1 + q2 + q3 = 1.
Rearranging Equations (1)-(4), it follows that aq21 + bq1 + c = 0, where
a = μ•3λ1[μ1 + μ2]
b = λ•2μ2λ1r + λ2μ
•
3(μ1 + μ2)− λ1μ2μ•3
c = −μ2μ•3λ•2.
The unique solution to this equation between 0 and 1 is
q1 =
−b +√b2 − 4ac
2a
.
The remaining equilibrium proportions may be calculated from the following relations
q2 =
μ1q1
μ2
; q3 = 1− q1 − q2; p1 = μ
•
3q3
λ1q1
Since these steady-state proportions depend on the strategy profiles adopted, the strategy
profile will be denoted using superscripts indicating firstly the strategy used by males and
secondly the strategy used by females. For example, pCD1 denotes the equilibrium proportion of
males searching when males care for their offspring, but females do not.
First, consider the conditions for no parental care to be an ESS. To find the equilibrium
frequencies when neither sex cares for offspring, set μ•3 = μD3 and λ•2 = λD2 in Equations (2)-(3).
From the Fisher condition, the average reproduction rate of females must be r times the
average reproduction rate of males. There are two ways of calculating the reproduction rate
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of males. Firstly, it can be calculated as the relative number of offspring surviving from a
breeding attempt divided by the mean cycle time, which is the mean time required to move
from the searching state to the breeding state and back again. Assume neither parent cares for
the offspring. Define this mean cycle time to be TDD. It follows that
TDD =
1
λ1qDD1
+
1
λD2
=
λD2 + λ1q
DD
1
λD2 λ1q
DD
1
.
Since the relative number of offspring surviving per breeding attempt is 1, the mean reproduction
rate of males is given by RDD, where
(5) RDD =
1
TDD
=
λD2 λ1q
DD
1
λD2 + λ1q
DD
1
The second way of calculating the reproduction rate of males is by noting that it must be
the population rate of males entering the breeding state multiplied by the relative number of
surviving offspring per breeding attempt. Hence, the mean reproduction rate of males is given
by
(6) RDD = λ1qDD1 p
DD
1 .
Note that from Equation (3),
pDD1 =
λD2
λD2 + λ1q
DD
1
.
Hence, Equations (5) and (6) are equivalent.
In order for no parental care to be an ESS, this rate must be greater that the reproduction
rate of a male mutant who cares for his offspring. Since this is a large population game, such a
mutant does not affect the steady-state frequencies or the reproduction rate of the population
as a whole. The reproduction rates of mutants are calculated by considering their average cycle
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time. The expected cycle time of a male mutant who cares for his offspring when the rest of the
population desert, denoted TDDm , is
TDDm =
1
λ1qDD1
+
1
λC2
=
λC2 + λ1q
DD
1
λC2 λ1q
DD
1
.
Since the relative number of surviving offspring of such a male per brood is km, it follows that
a male mutant cannot invade if
(7) λ1pDD1 q
DD
1 >
kmλ
C
2 λ1q
DD
1
λC2 + λ1q
DD
1
.
The mean cycle time of a female is the mean time required to go from the responsive state
to the breeding state and back. Denote the mean cycle time of a mutant female who cares for
her offspring when no-one else cares and the rate at which the state of any responsive female
changes by TDDf and μ
DD
R , respectively. It follows that μ
DD
R = λ1p
DD
1 r+μ1. The mean length of
time to the first change of state is 1
μDDR
. The probability that she finds a mate before becoming
non-receptive is λ1p
DD
1 r
μDDR
. Given she first finds a mate, then the mean time for such a mutant
female to return to the receptive state is 1
μC3
. Given she first becomes non-receptive, she must
then return to the receptive state (after an expected period of 1μ2 units) and then the additional
length of time expected to complete the cycle is TDDf , as she has simply returned to her starting
point. Hence, conditioning on the type of the first change of state,
TDDf =
1
μDDR
+
λ1p
DD
1 r
μDDR μ
C
3
+
μ1
μDDR
[
1
μ2
+ TDDf
]
.
This equation leads to
TDDf =
μ2μ
C
3 + μ2λ1p
DD
1 r + μ1μ
C
3
μC3 μ2λ1p
DD
1 r
.
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It follows that a female mutant cannot invade the population if
(8) λ1qDD1 p
DD
1 r >
kfμ
C
3 μ2λ1p
DD
1 r
μ2μC3 + μ2λ1p
DD
1 r + μ1μ
C
3
.
It should be noted that the OSR at such an equilibrium, denoted SDD, is given by
SDD =
rpDD1
qDD1
.
The OSR at other equilibria can be calculated in an analogous way.
The derivation of the stability conditions for the remaining three possible pure equilibria are
analogous. Therefore, just the equilibrium conditions are presented. In each case the left hand
side of the inequality is the reproduction rate of males (which according to the Fisher condition
must be the reproduction rate of the females divided by the ASR), the first entry on the right
hand side is the reproduction rate of a mutant male and the second entry is the reproduction
rate of a mutant female divided by the ASR.
To find the equilibrium frequencies when only males care for offspring, set μ•3 = μD3 and
λ•2 = λC2 in Equations (1)-(4). Only male parental care is an ESS if
(9) kmλ1qCD1 p
CD
1 > max
{
λ1q
CD
1 λ
D
2
λD2 + λ1q
CD
1
,
kbμ
C
3 μ2λ1p
CD
1
μ2μC3 + μ2λ1p
CD
1 r + μ1μ
C
3
}
.
To find the equilibrium frequencies when only females care for offspring, set μ•3 = μC3 and
λ•2 = λD2 in Equations (1)-(4). Only female parental care is an ESS if
(10) kfλ1qDC1 p
DC
1 > max
{
kbλ1λ
C
2 q
DC
1
λC2 + λ1q
DC
1
,
μD3 μ2λ1p
DC
1
μ2μD3 + μ2λ1p
DC
1 r + μ1μ
D
3
}
.
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To find the equilibrium frequencies when both parents care for offspring, set μ•3 = μC3 and
λ•2 = λC2 in Equations (1)-(4). Parental care by both sexes is an ESS if
(11) kbλ1qCC1 p
CC
1 > max
{
kfλ1λ
D
2 q
CC
1
λD2 + λ1q
CC
1
,
kmμ
D
3 μ2λ1p
CC
1
μ2μD3 + μ2λ1p
CC
1 r + μ1μ
D
3
}
.
3. Stable Polymorphisms and Mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Such equilibria may well be of interest with regard to variation in patterns of maternal or
paternal care within a single species. Hammock and Young (2005) report that the length of
the avpr1a microsatellite is associated with the patterns of paternal care in prairie voles, but
not with patterns of maternal care. According to Booth and Dabbs (1993), human males with
higher levels of testosterone are less likely to marry and when married are more likely to divorce.
The results obtained in this section may be helpful in explaining which sex is more likely to show
such variable patterns and under what circumstances such variation might be observed, even
when there is no observable difference between individuals of a particular sex.
One important question in evolutionary game theory relates to whether a mixed ESS (at which
each individual uses the appropriate randomized strategy) corresponds to a stable polymorphism
(at which each individual uses a pure strategy) such that the proportion of individuals using a
given action at the polymorphism equals the probability of that action being used at the mixed
ESS. See Maynard Smith (1982) for a overview of this question. For the model considered, if
there is a stable polymorphism, the probability of using a particular action at the mixed ESS
will differ from the proportion of individuals using that action at the stable polymorphism.
This occurs for the following reason: Suppose all males use the same mixed strategy ”care with
probability p, otherwise desert”. The probability that a searcher will care is clearly p. Now
suppose a proportion p of males care. Since carers spend a greater proportion of time in the
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breeding state, the probability that a male in the searching state is a carer will be less than p.
Hence, the expected number of surviving offspring of a female from mating differs in the two
considered scenarios. For further illustration of this issue, see Ramsey (2009a).
The following types of polymorphisms and mixed ESSes are among the possible equilibria:
1) A complete polymorphism: In both sexes, a certain proportion of individuals always
care, while the remainder always desert. An individual’s reproduction rate is independent
of the strategy used.
2) A male polymorphism: At such an equilibrium all females use the same pure strat-
egy. A mutant female using the other pure strategy will obtain a lower reward. Some
males always care and the remainder always desert. A male’s reproduction rate is inde-
pendent of the strategy used.
3) A female polymorphism: As above, but females, rather than males, show variation
in observed behaviour.
4) A completely mixed ESS: At such an equilibrium all individuals follow the mixed
strategy appropriate to their sex.
5) A male mixed ESS: At such an equilibrium all females use the same pure strategy.
All males use the same mixed strategy.
6) A female mixed ESS: As above, but females, rather than males, use a mixed strat-
egy.
The following criterion for the stability of a polymorphism is also required: Suppose at a
polymorphism a proportion s of the members of one sex cares, 0 < s < 1. If this proportion
rises above s (falls below s), then selection must favour deserting (favour caring, respectively).
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This condition ensures that if the frequencies of carers is slightly different from the equilibrium
frequency s, then selection acts in such a way that this proportion tends towards s. An analogous
condition, where s is interpreted as the probability of caring, is required for the stability of a
mixed ESS.
It is possible that a population could be at equilibrium in a multitude of ways. For example,
all males could follow the same randomized strategy, while some females always care while the
other females always desert. It is also possible that in both sexes some individuals follow pure
strategies while others follow mixed strategies. The focus in this paper will be on single sex
polymorphisms. One type of single sex mixed ESS will be derived for comparative purposes. To
keep the paper of reasonable length, other types of equilibria are not considered here.
3.1. Stable Male Polymorphisms with Female Carers. The equilibrium proportions at
such a polymorphism will be denoted using the superscript PC. Suppose there exists a stable
polymorphism in which females always care and a proportion sPCm of males care. Define p
PC
1,C
and pPC1,D to be the proportion of male carers and deserters who are searching, respectively. At
equilibrium, the population rate at which male carers move from the searching state must equal
the rate at which they move in the opposite direction. Hence,
(12) λC2 (1− pPC1,C) = λ1qPC1 pPC1,C .
Similarly, considering the male deserters,
(13) λD2 (1− pPC1,D) = λ1qPC1 pPC1,D.
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As before,
μ1q
PC
1 = μ2q
PC
2(14)
qPC1 + q
PC
2 + q
PC
3 = 1.(15)
The rate at which male carers find mates is λ1pPC1,Cq
PC
1 and the relative number of surviving
offspring from such matings is kb. Hence, the reproduction rate of male carers is kbλ1pPC1,Cq
PC
1 .
Similarly, the reproduction rate of male deserters is kfλ1pPC1,Dq
PC
1 . At such an equilibrium the
reproduction rates of male deserters and male carers must be equal. Hence,
(16) kbpPC1,C = kfp
PC
1,D.
Solving Equations (12)-(16),
qPC1 =
λD2 λ
C
2 (kb − kf )
λ1(λD2 kf − λC2 kb)
qPC2 =
μ1λ
D
2 λ
C
2 (kb − kf )
μ2λ1(λD2 kf − λC2 kb)
qPC3 = 1−
λD2 λ
C
2 (kb − kf )(μ1 + μ2)
μ2λ1(λD2 kf − λC2 kb)
pPC1,C =
λD2 kf − λC2 kb
kb(λD2 − λC2 )
pPC1,D =
λD2 kf − λC2 kb
kf (λD2 − λC2 )
.
The total proportion of males searching is pPC1 , where
pPC1 = s
PC
m p
PC
1,C + (1− sPCm )pPC1,N .
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Considering the population rate of transition of females between the breeding and receptive
states,
λ1q
PC
1 r[s
PC
m p
PC
1,C + (1− sPCm )pPC1,D] = μC3 qPC3 .
Together with Equation (16), this leads to
sPCm =
kb
kb − kf
[
1− μ
C
3 q
PC
3
λ1qPC1 p
PC
1,Dr
]
.
For such a stable polymorphism to exist, the following conditions must be satisfied: 0 < qPCi < 1,
i = 1, 2, 3, 0 < pPC1,• < 1, • ∈ {N,C} and 0 < sPCm < 1. These conditions lead to
kb
kf
<
λD2 [λ1μ2 + λ
C
2 (μ1 + μ2)]
λC2 [λ1μ2 + λ
D
2 (μ1 + μ2)]
(17)
kf
kb
<
μC3 q
PC
3
λ1qPC1 p
PC
1,Cr
< 1(18)
In addition, a female carer must have a higher reproduction rate than a mutant female de-
serter. The mean reproduction rate of a female carer is r times the mean reproduction rate of
a male, i.e. kbλ1p1,CqPC1 r. Arguing as in the case of a pure ESS, the mean cycle length of a
mutant female deserter is
TPCf =
μ2μ
D
3 + μ2λ1p
PC
1 r + μ1μ
D
3
μD3 μ2λ1p
PC
1 r
.
The probability that a female mates a male carer is given by
sPCm p
PC
1,C
pPC1
. It follows that the following
is a necessary condition for such a stable polymorphism:
(19) kbλ1pPC1,Cq
PC
1 >
μD3 μ2λ1[kms
PC
m p
PC
1,C + (1− sPCm )pPC1,D]
μ2μD3 + μ2λ1p
PC
1 r + μ1μ
D
3
.
As stated earlier, selection must act in such a way that the proportion of males caring tends
towards sPCm . Consider a population in which all females care and a proportion sm of males care.
As sm increases, intuitively the proportion of males searching for a mate decreases. It follows
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that females take longer to find a mate and hence the proportion of females searching for a mate
is increasing in sm. The ratio of the reproductive rate of a male carer to the reproductive rate
of a male deserter is given by
kbλ
C
2 (λ
D
2 + λ1q1)
kfλ
D
2 (λ
C
2 + λ1q1)
.
Since kb, km, λD2 and λ
C
2 are fixed, this ratio is determined by the ratio between λ
D
2 + λ1q1 and
λC2 + λ1q1. Since λ
D
2 > λ
C
2 , this ratio is decreasing in q1. Hence, as the proportion of male
carers increases, selection increasingly favours male deserters. It follows that there can be at
most one such stable polymorphism and the conditions given by Inequalities (17), (18) and (19)
are sufficient.
The derivations of the form of the remaining types of single sex stable polymorphism are
analogous. They are given in the appendix for completeness. It should be noted that, apart from
the specific case kf = km =
√
kb, the set of equations defining a stable complete polymorphism
are difficult to solve analytically and only numeric solutions have been found. Due to lack of
space, complete polymorphisms are omitted.
3.2. A Male Mixed ESS with Female Carers. Now suppose that a male mixed ESS exists
in which all females care and all the male play the same mixed strategy: care with probability
sMCm and desert with probability 1−sMCm . Analogously, the steady-state proportions are denoted
using the superscript MC. The expected length of time a male spends in the breeding state is
1
λM2
, where
1
λM2
=
sMCm
λC2
+
1− sMCm
λD2
.
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It follows that the rate at which males go from the breeding state to the searching state is
λM2 =
λC2 λ
D
2
sMCm λ
D
2 + (1− sMCm )λC2
.
Hence, the equations for the steady-state proportions are
qMC1 μ1 = q
MC
2 μ2(20)
λ1p
MC
1 rq
MC
1 = μ
C
3 q
MC
3(21)
qMC1 + q
MC
2 + q
MC
3 = 1(22)
λ1q
MC
1 p
MC
1 =
λC2 λ
D
2 (1− pMC1 )
sMCm λ
D
2 + (1− sMCm )λC2
.(23)
At such an ESS, the reproduction rate of a male is independent of his strategy. In particular,
the reproduction rate of a male mutant who always cares must be equal to the reproduction
rate of a male mutant who always deserts. The expected cycle length of a mutant male carer
and a mutant male deserter are given by TMCC and T
MC
D , where
TMCC =
1
λ1qMC1
+
1
λC2
=
λC2 + λ1q
MC
1
λ1qMC1 λ
C
2
TMCD =
1
λ1qMC1
+
1
λD2
=
λD2 + λ1q
MC
1
λ1qMC1 λ
D
2
.
Equating the reproduction rates of such mutants,
kb
TMCC
=
kf
TMCD
⇒ kbλ
C
2
λC2 + λ1q
MC
1
=
kfλ
D
2
λD2 + λ1q
MC
1
.
It follows that
qMC1 =
λC2 λ
D
2 (kb − kf )
λ1(λD2 kf − kbλC2 )
.
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Hence, qMC1 = q
PC
1 . From Equations (20) and (22), it can be seen that the proportion of females
in each of the three states at this mixed equilibrium must be the same as at the stable male
polymorphism where females care. From Equation (21), it follows that the proportion of males
in the searching state at the mixed equilibrium must equal the proportion of all males searching
at the corresponding male polymorphism. It follows that
pMC1 =
μC3 (λ
D
2 kf − λC2 kb)
λD2 λ
C
2 r(kb − kf )
− μ
C
3 (μ1 + μ2)
μ2λ1r
.
From Equation (23),
sMCm =
λC2 λ
D
2 (1− pMC1 )
λ1qMC1 p
MC
1 (λ
D
2 − λC2 )
− λ
C
2
λD2 − λC2
.
At such an equilibrium, the reproduction rate of female carers must be greater than the re-
production rate of a mutant female deserter. The expected number of surviving offspring of a
caring female per breeding attempt is sMCm kb + (1 − sMCm )kf . Hence, considering the expected
cycle length of a mutant female deserter,
[sMCm kb + (1− sMCm )kf ]λ1pMC1 qMC1 >
μD3 μ2λ1[kms
MC
m + (1− sMCm )]pMC1
μ2μD3 + μ2λ1p
MC
1 r + μ1μ
D
3
.
4. Numerical Results - Pure Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Profiles
Suppose μ1 = μ2 = 1, μD3 = 0.2, λ
D
2 = 5, λ
C
2 = μ
C
3 = 0.05, λ1 = 20, r = 1. These
parameters reflect the natural constraint that a deserting male can return to the pool of searchers
more quickly than a deserting female. For example, males of the cichlid fish species Aequidens
portalegrensis can spawn daily, whereas females can only spawn once every five days (see Polder
[1970]). The relative difference between these rates is generally much more pronounced in
mammal species (see Bronson [1989]). The adult sex ratio is 1.
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First consider how the set of pure ESS profiles depend on the gains from uniparental and
biparental care, i.e. on kf , km and kb. The procedure is to first find the steady-state proportions
for a given strategy profile and then check the equilibrium conditions [see Conditions (7)-(11)].
These calculations give
1.: No parental care is an ESS profile when km < 4.8793, kf < 3.9388.
2.: Just female parental care is an ESS profile when kf > 3.9406, kbkf < 1.9850.
3.: Just male parental care is an ESS profile when km > 60.4523, kbkm < 1.7450.
4.: Biparental care is an ESS profile kbkm > 3.3202,
kb
kf
> 12.8912.
Assume now that males are equally good at caring as females, i.e. km = kf . Figure 2
illustrates the set of pure ESS profiles (an approximate log scale is used). The benefits of
uniparental care increase from left to right. Along the diagonal there are no benefits from
biparental care compared to uniparental care. The gains from biparental care increase in the
vertical direction.
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Fig. 2: Set of Pure ESSs in the parental care game
The results obtained are qualitatively similar to those obtained by Balshine-Earn and Earn
(1997). Just male care is an ESS profile only when the gains from uniparental care are very
large and the gains from biparental care relatively small. However, in such cases just female
care is also an ESS profile and the results suggest that just female care will have a much larger
basin of attraction and so is likely to evolve.
5. Effect of the Parameters on the Set of Pure ESSes
The analysis below is not intended to be exhaustive, but to give an indication of the effect
of parameters on stable patterns of parental care. In general, just one or two parameters are
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changed at a time, while the remaining parameters take the same values as in the original
problem. The results presented here concentrate on factors that are not considered in either
Kokko and Jennions (2008) or Yamamura and Tsuji (1993) (e.g. the proportion of time for which
females are receptive) or conclusions that seem to deviate from the conclusions they make.
The results indicate that biparental care will only ever be observed if the number of surviving
offspring is around twice the number from uniparental care or greater. These results are similar
to those obtained by Yamamura and Tsuji, as well as McNamara et al. (2000).
5.1. Effect of the Proportion of Time for which Females are Receptive. To observe
the effect of the proportion of time for which females are fertile, the values of μ1 and μ2 are
changed in such a way that the mean time between a female’s fertile periods (given she does not
mate) remains constant (i.e. 1/μ1 + 1/μ2 is fixed), but the proportion of time for which female
is fertile varies. As μ1 decreases, the proportion of time for which a female is fertile increases.
The first line gives the minimum value of kf for just female care to be an ESS profile. The
second line gives the minimum value of km for which just male care is an ESS. The third line
gives the minimum value of kbkm for which biparental care is an ESS profile (this is the gain from
biparental care compared to female care required for males to care in addition to females). In
virtually all of the scenarios considered, this ratio determined the situations in which biparental
care is evolutionarily stable.
It can be seen from the first row (at least for the values of the other parameters considered)
that the proportion of time a female spends fertile has very little effect on her decision to care or
desert. The smaller the proportion of time females are fertile, the more likely males are to give
care as a second carer. This does not appear to agree with classical theory based on parental
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μ1 = 3, μ2 = 0.6 μ1 = 4/3, μ2 = 0.8 μ1 = μ2 = 1 μ1 = 0.8, μ2 = 4/3 μ1 = 0.6, μ2 = 3
kf required for DC 3.8283 3.9213 3.9406 3.9523 3.9641
km required for CD 34.1426 53.48319 60.4523 65.6048 71.7411
kb
kf
required for CC 8.0611 11.4155 12.8912 14.1514 15.9338
Table 4. Effect of proportion of time for which females are fertile on pure ESS
profiles. Proportion of time spent fertile increases from left to right.
investment. It seems logical that as females spend a smaller proportion of time fertile, they
invest more in producing eggs. Hence, the relative parental investment of males at the time of
fertilisation falls and so males should be less likely to care. However, this argument ignores the
fact that such increased female parental investment makes the OSR more male biased. Thus it
will be harder for males to find mates and so paternal care becomes a relatively better option.
Hence, these results seem consistent with the results of Queller (1997) and Kokko and Jennions
(2008), who take into account such feedback between patterns of parental care and the OSR.
It should be noted that changing the length of time between a female’s fertile periods while
leaving the proportion of time she remains fertile constant leaves the set of ESS profiles un-
changed.
5.2. Effect of the Level of Anisogomy. To observe the effect of the level of anisogomy, the
value of λD2 (the rate at which deserting males can return to the pool of searchers) was changed.
As λD2 increases the level of anisogomy increases.
Decreasing the level of anisogomy increases the likelihood of male care to some degree. How-
ever, male care is only expected when females also care. These conclusions are similar to the
ones made by Yamamura and Tsuji (1993), but seem to differ from the conclusions of Kokko
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λD2 = 20 λ
D
2 = 10 λ
D
2 = 5 λ
D
2 = 2.5 λ
D
2 = 1.25
kf required for DC 3.9410 3.9409 3.9406 3.9400 3.9388
km required for CD 109.9924 86.3930 60.4523 37.7702 21.5779
kb
kf
required for CC 14.1675 13.7149 12.8912 11.5088 9.4765
Table 5. Effect of length of time out for males on ESS profiles. Length of time
out increases from left to right.
and Jennions (2008), who conclude that given parental care is just as valuable as maternal care
and the ASR is one that males should give a similar level of care to females. One possible
explanation for this difference is the type of decision that is made. Yamamura and Tsuji and
the model presented here assume that the choice is either to care or not to care, while Kokko
and Jennions allow individuals to choose the time for which they care from some range. The
lowest level of anisogamy considered here (male deserters return to the pool of searchers about
6 times as quickly as female deserters) is of a similar level to that observed in cichlid fishes (see
Polder [1970]). It is not entirely clear what levels of anisogomy were considered by Kokko and
Jennions.
5.3. Effect of the Interaction Rate. The parameter λ1 can be interpreted as a measure of
the interaction rate between members of the opposite sex.
It should be noted that the model assumes that the population is large and free moving,
hence it seems natural to assume that the interaction rate should not be small in comparison
to the rate at which female deserters return to the pool of searchers. Given this assumption,
the interaction rate has very little effect on female behaviour. Males are more likely to care (as
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λ1 = 80 λ1 = 40 λ1 = 20 λ1 = 10 λ1 = 5
kf required for DC 3.9849 3.9700 3.9406 3.8835 3.7757
km required for CD 85.8639 75.2705 60.4523 43.5343 28.1682
kb
kf
required for CC 22.5284 17.1591 12.8912 9.5994 7.1196
Table 6. Effect of interaction rate on ESS profiles.
a second parent) at low interaction rates. This seems intuitive, since the lower the interaction
rate the harder it is to find a partner.
5.4. Effect of the Adult Sex Ratio. For large values of r (r > 1.32), the gain from biparental
care compared to just paternal care, kbkm , determines whether biparental care is stable. Thus,
the following table also gives the critical value of this ratio.
r = 2 r = 1.5 r = 1.32 r = 1 r = 23 r = 0.5
kf required for DC 3.9750 3.9603 3.9549 3.9406 3.9113 3.8824
km required for CD 50.7415 56.1156 57.7802 60.4523 62.9026 64.0186
kb
kf
required for CC 1.9706 2.8867 3.8309 12.8912 41.2752 50.7415
kb
km
required for CC 3.9415 3.8867 3.8309 3.3202 1.9717 1.5906
Table 7. Effect of adult sex ratio on ESS profiles.
The gains from care required for maternal care to be stable are almost independent of the
adult sex ratio. The results indicate that just paternal care is very unlikely to evolve even when
the sex ratio is very biased towards males. For low values of r, the pattern of parental care will
be for females to care if the gains from care are large enough and males will care in addition if the
gains from biparental care are large enough. The situation for large values of r seems somewhat
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more complex. If uniparental care evolves, then it seems that females will care. However, there
are situations in which males may be more ”willing” to be a second parent than females are to
care given that males care. In such a situation there will be ”conflict” over parental roles and
within the framework of the model presented here, we might expect varied patterns of parental
care. These results seem to be in line with those of Yamamura and Tsuji (1993), but discordant
with the results of Kokko and Jennions (2008), who predict a greater level of balance between
the level of care given by males and females. It is likely that this difference results from the types
of decision allowed (here either care or desert, but in Kokko and Jennions the time a parent
cares for is chosen from some interval).
6. Numerical Results - Stable Single Sex Polymorphisms
The existence of stable polymorphisms according to the values of kb and kf was investigated
for the set of problems given by the parameters for the original problem (μ1 = μ2 = 1, μD3 = 0.2,
λD2 = 5, λ
C
2 = μ
C
3 = 0.05, λ1 = 20, r = 1). It was assumed that km = kf . The calculations
involved are relatively straightforward, but time consuming and so the details are left out.
6.1. A Female Polymorphism when Males Desert. The two conditions for a putative
stable polymorphism to be valid are given by Inequalities (24) and (25) (see Appendix A),
which lead to 3.9388 < kf < 3.9406. It such be noted that this corresponds exactly to the range
of kf for which neither no parental care nor just maternal care are ever stable.
Secondly, a male deserter must have a higher reproduction rate than a male carer. This
corresponds to Inequality (26), which gives
kb < k
2
f +
(kf − 1)2[40198− 10598kf + 100k2f ]
8150kf − 100k2f − 30550
.
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If kf is just above 3.9388, then essentially kb can take any value. As kf tends to the upper
boundary (approx. 3.9406), the maximum value of kb possible for such a polymorphism tends
to 1.9850kf .
Comparing these results with the results on pure equilibria (see Figure 2), it can be seen that
the range of values of kb and kf for which such a stable polymorphism can exist is given by a
narrow strip in the horizontal direction (i.e. a narrow range of kf ). The left hand boundary of
this region is the vertical boundary of the region in which no parental care is an ESS. The right
hand side of the boundary is made up of the left hand boundary of the region in which female
care is an ESS and a curve starting from the top left hand corner of this region. As gains from
biparental care increase (moving upwards on Figure 2), this strip becomes narrower.
When the gains from biparental care are small, there is no pure equilibrium. Hence, it seems
that such a polymorphism could evolve. However, the narrow range of parameters suitable for
such a polymorphism to be stable suggests that we would not observe such patterns of parental
care.
6.2. A Female Polymorphism when Males Care. The two conditions for a putative stable
polymorphism to be valid are given by Inequalities (27) and (28) (see Appendix B), which lead
to 1.7450 < kbkm < 3.3202. It such be noted that this corresponds exactly to the range of values
of this ratio for which not all females should care given that males care, but just paternal care
cannot be an ESS.
Secondly, a male carer must have a higher reproduction rate than a male deserter. This
corresponds to Inequality (29), which gives for 1.7450 < c = kbkm < 1.7544
km >
1175c2 − 9925c + 20000
49c3 + 5003c2 − 28978c + 35176 .
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For 1.7544 < c < 3.3202, the direction of this inequality is reversed. It can be shown that for
1.7544 < c < 3.3202 the righthand side of the inequality above is negative. Hence, there can be
no such stable polymorphism for this range of values of c.
Now consider the range 1.7450 < c < 1.7544. As c tends to the lower boundary of this interval,
the minimum value of kf for which the above inequality is satisfied is 60.4523. As c tends to the
upper boundary of this interval, the minimum value of kf required tends to infinity. It follows
that the region in which there is a stable female polymorphism with male care is a very thin
strip above the region in which just paternal care is an ESS (see Figure 2). Since just maternal
care is an ESS in this region, it seems unlikely that a stable female polymorphism with males
caring would evolve.
6.3. A Male Polymorphism when Females Desert. The two conditions for a putative
stable polymorphism to be valid are given by Inequalities (30) and (31) (see Appendix C),
which lead to 4.8793 < km(= kf ) < 60.4523. It should be noted that this corresponds exactly
to the range of km for which paternal care cannot be an ESS, but not all males should desert
given that females desert.
Secondly, a female deserter must have a higher reproduction rate than a female carer. This
corresponds to Inequality (32), which gives
kb < k
2
m +
(km − 1)2[40150− 10550km + 100k2m]
10694km − 100k2m − 49798
.
As km tends to the upper limit the region given above (approx. 60.4523), the maximum value of
kb for which such a stable polymorphism exists tends to 1.7450km. Hence, the right hand border
of the region in which such a polymorphism may occur coincides with the left hand border of
the region in which just male care is an ESS.
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As km tends to the lower limit of this region (approx. 4.8793), the righthand side of the
inequality above tends to −∞. Hence, the minimum value of km required for such a stable
polymorphism to occur must be greater than 4.8793. Since kb ≥ km, in order to find the
minimum required value of km, it is necessary to solve
km = k2m +
(km − 1)2[40150− 10550km + 100k2m]
10694km − 100k2m − 49798
.
This leads to km ≈ 21.6493. It can be shown that for km > 21.6493 that the righthand side
of the equation above is greater than km. It follows that the region in which there is a stable
male polymorphism with deserting females is bounded above by a curve from the point on the
diagonal line corresponding to km = kf = 21.6493 to the top left hand corner of the region in
which just paternal care is an ESS. Since just maternal care is also an ESS in this region, it
seems likely that a male polymorphism in which females desert would never evolve.
6.4. A Male Polymorphism when Females Care. The two conditions for a putative stable
polymorphism to be valid are given by Inequalities (17) and (18), which lead to 1.9850 < c =
kb
kf
< 12.8912. This is precisely the range of values for which neither maternal care nor biparental
care can be an ESS.
Condition (19) states that a female carer must have a higher reproduction rate than a female
deserter. This leads to
kf >
20000− 301c− 97c2
25c3 + 5075c2 − 30322c + 44824 .
This is illustrated in Figure 3. Fixing kf , the set of values of kb for which a male polymorphism
with female care is stable can be derived from the graph. This is done by finding the values of
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Figure 3. Illustration of the region in which a stable male polymorphism with
female care exists. For a given value of kf such a stable polymorphism exists
when the horizontal line y = kf lies above the curve.
c = kbkf for which the horizontal line y = kf lies above the curve on the interval 1.9850 < c <
12.8912.
For example, for kf = 20, the line lies above the curve for 1.9850 < kbkf < 2.5468 and
3.2927 < kbkf < 12.8912. It follows that for kf = 20 there is a stable male polymorphism if
39.700 < kb < 50.936 or 65.854 < kb < 257.824.
The height of the curve when kbkf is 1.9850 is approximately 3.9406. From the form of the
graph when kf < 3.9406 there is only a stable polymorphism for large enough values of kbkf . The
following table gives the minimum value of kbkf for a stable male polymorphism of this type to
exist when kf is between 1 and 3.9406. This is given by the one value of c where the line y = kf
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intersects the curve. The maximum value in each case is 12.8912. Some numerical results are
given in the following table.
kf
kb
kf
required kf kbkf required
1.0 4.6716 2.0 4.1762
1.2 4.5266 2.2 4.1191
1.4 4.4126 2.4 4.0690
1.6 4.3197 3.0 3.9490
1.8 4.2422 3.9406 3.8180
Table 8. Region of Stability of Male Polymorphism for Small Values of kf
For intermediate values of kf , from kf = 3.9406 to the maximum height attained by the curve
kf = 103.0036, there are two ranges of kbkf for which there is a stable male polymorphism. The
first region is from 1.9850 to the value of c where the curve first intersects y = kf . The second
region is from the value of c at the second intersection of the curve with y = kf up to 12.8912.
For values of kbkf between these intersection points there is no stable male polymorphism. Some
numerical results are given in the following table.
For values of kf greater than 103.0036, a stable male polymorphism exists for all values of kbkf
between 1.9850 and 12.8912.
It can be seen that the set of values of kf and kb for which such a stable polymorphism covers
a wide range of the values for which there is no pure equilibrium, as well as some of the region in
which no parental care is an ESS profile. Hence, within the framework of the model presented,
in many scenarios a system could evolve in which females cared, but males showed variation in
their behaviour.
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kf Region 1 for kbkf Region 2 for
kb
kf
5 (1.9850,1.9924) (3.8113,12.8912)
10 (1.9850,2.3572) (3.4734,12.8912)
20 (1.9850,2.5468) (3.2927,12.8912)
30 (1.9850,2.6357) (3.2069,12.8912)
50 (1.9850,2.7339) (3.1110,12.8912)
75 (1.9850,2.8112) (3.0350,12.8912)
100 (1.9850,2.8916) (2.9551,12.8912)
Table 9. Regions of Stability of Male Polymorphisms for Intermediate Values of kf
The set of values of kf and kb for which no stable profile has been described in this paper
is made up of intermediate values of kf (approximately between 5 and 100 for the problem
considered) and intermediate values of kbkf (approximately between 2 and 4). Initial calculations
indicate that there are stable complete polymorphisms in this region (they also exist in other
regions). The analytical results show that there can be only one stable single sex polymorphism
of a given type, but numerical results indicate that there may be multiple stable complete
polymorphisms for given values of kf and kb.
In order to gain more insight into the patterns of parental care that evolve in various sce-
narios, consider the stable proportion of male carers for three values of kf , allowing kbkf to vary
between 1.9850 and 12.8912. The values of kf considered are 2, 20 and 120. These three values
correspond to the set of values of kf for which: a) there is a stable male polymorphism only for
relatively large values of kbkf , b) there are two intervals of values of
kb
kf
for which there is a stable
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male polymorphism, c) for all values of kbkf between 1.9850 and 12.8912 there is a stable male
polymorphism.
Figure 4 illustrates how the proportion of carers at a stable polymorphism and the probability
of caring at a mixed equilibrium change according to kb/kf . The forms of these graphs are very
similar for all values of kf . The proportion of carers at a stable polymorphism is greater than
the probability of caring at a mixed equilibrium. However, numerical calculations indicate that
the probability of an individual in the pool of searchers caring is independent of the equilibrium.
Figures 5-7 illustrate the reproduction rates of female carers and of a mutant female deserter.
In order for the polymorphism to be stable, female carers must reproduce at a faster rate than
the mutant.
Figure 5 shows that for kf = 2, there is only a stable polymorphism for relatively large values
of kb/kf (between 4.1762 and 12.8912). Figure 4 indicates that at any such equilibrium the
proportion of male carers will always be high. That is to say for kf = 2 and kb < 8.3524 there
will only be one ESS (no parental care). For values of kb between 8.3524 and 25.7824, there is
also a stable polymorphism where all females and a large proportion of males care.
Figure 6 shows that for kf = 20 there is no stable polymorphism for intermediate values of
kb/kf . In fact, there is a stable polymorphism when 1.9850 < kb/kf < 2.5468 and 3.2927 <
kb/kf < 12.8912. As kb/kf increases from 1.9850, the proportion of male carers at such a
polymorphism increases very rapidly. This means that there are less males in the pool of
searchers (i.e. males face less competition when looking for a mate), which favours deserters.
This factor seems to initially outweigh the gains from parental care and so the polymorphism
becomes unstable. For larger values of kb/kf the proportion of male carers at such a, now
putative, polymorphism rises more slowly and so in turn the gains from parental care begin to
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Figure 4. Proportion of male carers at the stable polymorphism and probability
of caring at the mixed ESS for kf = 200.
outweigh the advantages gained by deserters due to reduced competition for females. Hence, for
larger values of kb/kf the polymorphism again becomes stable.
Figure 7 shows that for kf = 200 the polymorphism is stable for 1.9850 < kb/kf < 12.8912.
There is a range of values of kb/kf for which a mutant female deserter reproduces at virtually
the same rate as a female carer (this is true for all large values of kf when kb/kf ≈ 3 in the
problem considered). This may indicate a large degree of conflict over which parent(s) should
care in such situations.
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Figure 5. Reproduction rates of female carers and a mutant female deserter at
a putative stable polymorphism with kf = 2. The polymorphism is stable if the
reproduction rate of carers is greater than the reproduction rate of a deserter
(i.e. for large values of kb/kf ).
7. Conclusion
This article has presented a model of a parental care game which is an adaptation of the
model of Yamamura and Tsuji (1993). Unlike their model, individuals of the rarer sex in the
mating pool do not find a mate immediately on becoming receptive. This approach allows us
to model the interaction between the patterns of parental care and the OSR. In this way ,the
model presented shows similarities to the model presented by Kokko and Jennions (2008).
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Figure 6. Reproduction rates of female carers and a mutant female deserter at
a putative stable polymorphism with kf = 20. The polymorphism is stable if the
reproduction rate of carers is greater than the reproduction rate of a deserter.
(i.e. not for intermediate values of kb/kf ).
The model can be thought of as representing a primeval situation in which the only difference
between the sexes is the gametes they produce. By definition, females produce larger gametes
and hence their minimum time out is greater than the minimum time out of males. Given such
a scenario, it is generally expected that if uniparental care occurs, then females care. Males care
if the gains from biparental care are sufficient. The major exception to this seems to occur when
the ASR is male biased. In this case, if uniparental care is evolutionarily stable, then again
females care. However, the outcome is somewhat unclear when there are moderate gains from
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Figure 7. Reproduction rates of female carers and a mutant female deserter at
a putative stable polymorphism with kf = 200. The polymorphism is stable for
all values of kb/kf in the range considered.
biparental care. In this case, males should care given females care, but females should not care
given that males care (this is never the case for an even or female biased ASR). One possible
area for future research is to investigate what patterns of parental care would evolve in such
situations.
While Kokko and Jennions assume that both parents choose the time for which they care from
some range, the model here assumes that the decision is dichotomous: i.e. a parent either cares
or deserts. In the case of St. Peter’s fish (see Balshine-Earn and Earn [1997]), if a parent decides
to brood after fertilization, then he/she broods until the eggs hatch otherwise the offspring will
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not survive. Hence, in this scenario it seems reasonable to restrict the set of available actions in
this way. In other cases, it may well be realistic to allow parents to case the level of care they give
from a range of values. Comparing the results obtained here and in Yamamura and Tsuji (1993)
with the results obtained by Kokko and Jennions (2008), it seems that situations in which the
decision is dichotomous make it more likely that female only care evolves, even when the ASR
is heavily male-biased (Kokko and Jennions predict a more even distribution of parental care
between males and females if the only difference between the sexes is the anisogomy of gametes).
The model presented here can be easily adapted to allow parents to choose the level of care they
give from a range. It would be interesting to see whether the predominance of female care found
here is an artifact of the assumptions made regarding the set of actions available to the parents.
Also, the models compared here all assume that the decisions made regarding parental care are
made simultaneously, whereas in reality one parent may be able to desert before the other has
an opportunity to desert, who can react to such a desertion (this is discussed more fully below in
comparing the parental care patterns of mammals, birds and fish). Dawkins (1976) argues that
if uniparental care is evolutionarily stable, the sex which can desert earlier will be the one which
deserts. It would be relatively easy to adapt the model to take this asymmetry into account and
in this way explain what effect this asynchronicity of decisions effects the evolution of patterns
of parental care.
In practice, individuals may well balance the level of parental care they give with other types
of behaviour on a day-to-day basis and may well be able to react to the level of care provided by
their partner (see e.g. McNamara et al., 1999 and Houston et al., 2005). However, adapting the
model presented here to such adaptive behaviour is likely to lead to an overly complex model.
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Analytical results have been obtained describing so called single sex polymorphisms, at which
variation in behaviour is observed within a particular sex. The results suggest that variable
patterns of parental care within a species are more likely to be observed among males than
among females. Such equilibria may evolve for intermediate gains from biparental care. In such
cases, males exhibiting a relatively rare behaviour will be selected for. Those models considered
here in which parents choose the time they care for from a range (Maynard Smith [1977], Grafen
and Sibly [1978] and Kokko and Jennions [2008]) assume that the ESS profile is pure. However,
it may be that for a given level of care by e.g. the female, for low levels of care from the male
the marginal gains from an increase in the level of care he gives may be increasing. Hence, it
seems possible that for such models stable polymorphisms exist in which some males ”desert”
(i.e. give the least possible amount of care) and some males ”care” (i.e. give some higher level
of care).
One particular advantage of this model compared to the model of Yamamura and Tsuji (1993)
is that it could be extended to include variation between individuals and take mate choice into
account. Although it would seem that such a model would be too complex to obtain analytic
results, numerical results could be obtained using simulations. As Sze´kely et al. (2000) note
there is strong feedback between mate choice and patterns of parental care. Seki et al. (2007)
use a genetic model to simulate the coevolution of patterns of polyandry and parental care. It
has been noted that many species in which only females care there is sexual dimorphism. In
such species males often invest in ”weaponry” or ”ornaments”, in order to mate with as many
females as possible while avoiding the costs of parental care (see Weckerly [1998], Duckworth
et al. [2003], Bro-Jorgenson [2007] Mitchell et al. [2007]). However, the relation between
attractiveness and parental care is not entirely clear. Moller and Jennions (2001) observe that
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males who give parental care can be interpreted as attractive. Balshine-Earn (1995) also argues
there may well be a correlation between the attractiveness of a partner and the level of care
they can give. Females prefer larger males as mates, who are more able to give parental care
than small males (as the same level of parental care from a large male would cost him less that
it would cost a smaller male). Sargent and Gross (1993) argue that in teleost fish the costs
to females of caring are greater than the costs to males of caring, since females invest more in
reproduction and thus have lower reserves than males.
The model presented here assumes that the only difference between individuals is sex, whereas
obviously individuals vary according to other traits. In this case, individuals should not only
care about the number of offspring surviving to adulthood, but also the quality of such offspring.
Field and Brace (2004) note some of the benefits extended parental care gives to offspring apart
from increased survival. One goal of future research should be to develop models to investigate
under what conditions dimorphism may evolve from a non-dimorphic species in which there
is some initial variation between the members of the population. Future research should also
include a dynamic analysis of how the population evolves in various scenarios, rather than the
static equilibrium analysis carried out here. This would be particularly useful in cases where
there are multiple equilibria and/or complete stable polymorphisms.
One question that is not addressed here is the difference between patterns of care in various
classes of species. As Clutton-Brock (2007) observes, once sex differences have evolved, selection
can become sex specific and the various reproductive processes in different classes may lead to
e.g. dimorphism or a variety of patterns of parental care. For example, female care is present in
virtually all mammal species, with males caring in less than 10% of species (see Alcock [2009],
Clutton-Brock [1991]). In bird species, female care is much more common than male care and
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biparental care is more common than in mammals (see Cockburn [2006]). These differences are
somewhat predictable considering the results given above and the physiological constraints of
reproduction in these classes. The gains from biparental care with respect to uniparental care
in birds are likely to be relatively large. This is due to the fact that one parent can incubate
the eggs while their partner forages. In mammalian species, females have evolved to specialise
in caring for offspring (e.g. supplying milk) and the benefits of biparental care seem less clear.
Hence, it is expected that the tendency for just female care to be evolutionarily stable is stronger
in mammals than in the ”primeval” species considered by the model. The patterns of parental
care in fishes are much more varied. Male only care is observed in many fish species (see Goodwin
et al. [1998] Reynolds et al. [2002]). Various reasons have been put forward for this difference.
Hale and St. Mary (2007) note that males who are already caring for offspring are preferred
by females. The model presented here is inappropriate in this case, as it is assumed that males
either care for young or attempt to gain extra matings. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that
the length of male time outs in relation to the length of female time outs is longer in fish than
in mammals or birds (see Levitan and Petersen, [1995]). Another possible reason is that due to
external fertilisation, in fish species females are able to desert before males have the opportunity
of deserting, while in mammal and bird species it is the opposite way round.
One major drawback of the model is that it does not take into account the certainty of
parentage. Queller (1997) argues that one reason for males providing less parental care is that
they are less certain of their paternity. In socially monogamous mammal and bird species, the
fact that males attempt to gain extra-pair copulations means that males will be on average less
related to the offspring than their partners are. Dawson (1996) describes a so called trade off
between paternal care and attempting to gain extra matings. Magrath and Komdeur (2003)
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argue that male care does not always compromise the search for additional partners. Moller and
Birkhead (1993) observe that there is a correlation between the level of male care and certainty
of parentage. Moller and Thornhill (1998) argue that males adjust their level of care according to
their expected future rewards, i.e. if they expect that their latest brood is more highly related
to them than average they will care more. Westneat and Sherman (1993) come to a similar
conclusion and furthermore argue that given the expected relationship of two males to their
partner’s present brood is equal to their average relationship, then those two males should give
the same level of paternal care, even if one male is on average more related to the offspring of
his partner than the other. Houston and McNamara (2002) argue that the model of Westneat
and Sherman is inconsistent and that the level of male care must depend on the average level
of relationship of a male to his partner’s brood. They look at how levels of care should vary
from season to season, within a population, in different populations of the same species and
across species. Kokko and Morrell (2005) note that by caring for their offspring, males also
tend to guard themselves against lower levels of paternity. They show that the relationship
between guarding and paternity levels is complex. The traditional argument is that low levels of
paternity lead to males trying to mate with more females and caring less, which leads to lower
levels of paternity etc. However, this circle can be broken by mate guarding. It is clear that the
problem of the uncertainty of parentage is a great challenge to modellers.
Another problem with the model presented here is that it does not consider the mortality of
individuals. Ramsey (2009b) derives pure ESSes for a similar problem in which the mortality
rate may depend on the state and/or strategy of an individual. In this case one should consider
three sex ratios. The incoming sex ratio, ISR, is the ratio of the rate at which males join the adult
population to the rate at which females join the adult population. This parameter is defined
48 D. M. Ramsey
exogenously. The OSR and ASR depend on the strategy profile used and can be calculated
using the fact that in a steady state the rates at which males and females mature must equal
the rates at which adult males and females die.
Roff (2002) notes that present investment lowers expected future reproductive success. Such a
relationship would be difficult to capture using a model of the form considered here. One way of
doing this would be to allow individuals to age at different rates according to the strategy they
use. Clutton-Brock et al. (1985) and Clutton-Brock and Isvaran (2007) note that in dimorphic
mammalian species there is a very female biased ASR, due to the fact that males take longer
to mature and male-male competition leads to a higher rate of mortality among adult males
than among adult females. Liker and Sze´kely (2005) and Donald (2007) observe that in most
bird species there tends to a more balanced ASR than in mammalian species. Also, in avian
species where just female care is observed the ASR tends to be female biased. Kokko and
Monaghan (2001) note that the relationship between mortality and patterns of parental care
may be complex. For example, suppose in a species where only female care is observed, the
mortality rate of males increases due to increased male-male competition (this may be due to
density dependent effects). The increased cost of male-male competition would lead to a more
female biased ASR, i.e. greater gains for the males who outcompete others. It is not clear
whether these gains outweigh the increased costs of male-male competition.
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Appendix A. Female Polymorphism when Males Desert
Let qDPi,• denote the proportion of females using strategy • in state i, • ∈ {C,D}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and sDPf be the proportion of female carers at such a stable polymorphism. From the equilibrium
conditions for the proportions of individuals in each state,
qDP1,• μ1 = q
DP
2,• μ2
λ1q
DP
1,• p
DP
1 r = μ
•
3q
DP
3,•
qDP1,• + q
DP
2,• + q
DP
3,• = 1
λ1p
DP
1 [s
DP
f q
DP
1,C + (1− sDPf )qDP1,D ] = λD2 (1− pDP1 ),
where • ∈ {C,D}. Since female deserters must have the same reproduction rate as female carers,
qDP1,D = q
DP
1,C kf .
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Solving this system of eight equations,
qDP1,D =
μ2(μD3 − kfμC3 )
(μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qDP1,C =
μ2(μD3 − kfμC3 )
kf (μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qDP2,D =
μ1(μD3 − kfμC3 )
(μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qDP2,C =
μ1(μD3 − kfμC3 )
kf (μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qDP3,D =
(kf − 1)μC3
μD3 − μC3
qDP3,C =
(kf − 1)μD3
kf (μD3 − μC3 )
pDP1 =
μD3 μ
C
3 (μ1 + μ2)(kf − 1)
μ2λ1r(μD3 − μC3 kf )
sDPf =
kf
kf − 1
[
1− λ
D
2 (1− pDP1 )
λ1pDP1 q
DP
1,D
]
.
For this solution to be valid, the following must hold:
kf <
μD3 [μ2λ1r + (μ1 + μ2)μ
C
3 ]
μC3 [μ2λ1r + (μ1 + μ2)μ
D
3 ]
(24)
1
kf
<
λD2 (1− pDP1 )
λ1pDP1 q
DP
1
< 1.(25)
In addition, a male carer must have a lower reproduction rate than a male deserter. This gives
(26) λ1pDP1 q
DP
1,D >
λC2 λ1[s
DP
f q
DP
1,C kb + (1− sDPf )qDP1,Dkm]
λC2 + λ1[sfq
DP
1,C + (1− sDPf )qDP1,D ]
.
Appendix B. Female Polymorphism when Males Care
Let qCPi,• denote the proportion of females using strategy • in state i, • ∈ {C,D}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and sCPf be the proportion of female carers at such a stable polymorphism. From the equilibrium
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conditions for the proportions of individuals in each state,
qCP1,• μ1 = q
CP
2,• μ2
λ1q
CP
1,• p
CP
1 r = μ
•
3q
CP
3,•
qCP1,• + q
CP
2,• + q
CP
3,• = 1
λ1p
CP
1 [s
CP
f q
CP
1,C + (1− sCPf )qCP1,D] = λC2 (1− pCP1 ),
where • ∈ {C,D}. Since female deserters must have the same reproduction rate as female carers,
qCP1,Dkm = q
CP
1,Ckb.
Solving this system of eight equations,
qCP1,D =
μ2(kmμD3 − kbμC3 )
km(μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qCP1,C =
μ2(kmμD3 − kbμC3 )
kb(μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qCP2,D =
μ1(kmμD3 − kbμC3 )
km(μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qCP2,C =
μ1(kmμD3 − kfμC3 )
kb(μD3 − μC3 )(μ1 + μ2)
qCP3,D =
(kb − km)μC3
km(μD3 − μC3 )
qCP3,C =
(kb − km)μD3
kb(μD3 − μC3 )
pCP1 =
μD3 μ
C
3 (μ1 + μ2)(kb − km)
μ2λ1r(kmμD3 − kbμC3 )
sCPf =
kb
kb − km
[
1− λ
C
2 (1− pCP1 )
λ1pCP1 q
CP
1,D
]
.
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For this solution to be valid, the following must hold:
kb
km
<
μD3 [μ2λ1r + (μ1 + μ2)μ
C
3 ]
μC3 [μ2λ1r + (μ1 + μ2)μ
D
3 ]
(27)
km
kb
<
λC2 (1− pCP1 )
λ1pCP1 q
CP
1,D
< 1.(28)
In addition, a male deserter must have a lower reproduction rate than a male carer. This gives
(29) λ1pCP1 q
CP
1,Dkm >
λD2 λ1[s
CP
f q
CP
1,Ckf + (1− sCPf )qCP1,D]
λD2 + λ1[sfq
CP
1,C + (1− sCPf )qCP1,D]
.
Appendix C. Male Polymorphism when Females Desert
Let pPD1,• denote the proportion of males using strategy • in the searching state, • ∈ {C,D},
and sPDm be the proportion of male carers at such a stable polymorphism. From the equilibrium
conditions for the proportions of individuals in each state,
λ1p
PD
1,Dq
PD
1 = λ
D
2 (1− pPD1,D)
λ1p
PD
1,C q
PD
1 = λ
C
2 (1− pPD1,C )
qPD1 μ1 = q
PD
2 μ2
qPD1 + q
PD
2 + q
PD
3 = 1
λ1q
PD
1 [s
PD
m p
PD
1,C + (1− sPDm )pPD1,D]r = μD3 qPD3 .
Since male deserters and male carers must have the same reproduction rate, pPD1,D = kmp
PD
1,C .
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Solving this system of six equations,
qPD1 =
λC2 λ
D
2 (km − 1)
λ1[λD2 − λC2 km]
qPD2 =
μ1λ
C
2 λ
D
2 (km − 1)
μ2λ1[λD2 − λC2 km]
qPD3 = 1−
(μ1 + μ2)λC2 λ
D
2 [km − 1]
μ2λ1[λD2 − λC2 km]
pPD1,D =
λD2 − λC2 km
λD2 − λC2
pPD1,C =
λD2 − λC2 km
km(λD2 − λC2 )
sPDm =
km
km − 1
[
1− μ
D
3 q
PD
3
λ1qPD1 rp
PD
1,D
]
.
For this solution to be valid, the following must hold:
km <
λD2 [λ
C
2 (μ1 + μ2) + λ1μ2]
λC2 [λ
D
2 (μ1 + μ2) + λ1μ2]
(30)
1
km
<
μD3 q
PD
3
λ1qPD1 p
PD
1,Dr
.(31)
In addition the reproduction rate of a female carer must be lower than the reproduction rate of
a female deserter. It follows that
(32) λ1qPD1 p
PD
1,Dr >
μ2μ
C
3 λ1r[s
PD
m p
PD
1,Ckb + (1− sPDm )pPD1,Dkf ]
μ2μC3 + μ1μ
C
3 + λ1μ2r[sPDm p
PD
1,C + (1− sPDm )pPD1,D]
.
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